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The province of Ontario has two publicly funded school systems: secular schools (known as public
schools) that are open to all students, and separate schools that are open to children with Catholic backgrounds.
The systems are administered independently and receive equal funding per student.  In this paper
we use detailed school and student-level data to assess whether competition between the systems leads
to improved efficiency.  Building on a simple model of school choice, we argue that incentives for
effort will be greater in areas where there are more Catholic families, and where these families are
less committed to a particular system. To measure the local determinants of cross-system competition
we study the effects of school openings on enrollment growth at nearby elementary schools. We find
significant cross-system responses to school openings, with a magnitude that is proportional to the
fraction of Catholics in the area, and is higher in more rapidly growing areas. We then test whether
schools that face greater cross-system competition have higher productivity, as measured by test score
gains between 3rd and 6th grade.  We estimate a statistically significant but modest-sized impact of
potential competition on the growth rate of student achievement.  The estimates suggest that extending
competition to all students would raise average test scores in 6th grade by 6-8% of a standard deviation.
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  Faced with budgetary pressure and growing concerns over student achievement, policy 
makers around the world are struggling to raise the efficiency of public schools.
1  Starting with 
Friedman (1955) many economists have argued that a cost-effective way to boost performance is 
to limit the monopoly power of local school districts.  For this prescription to work, families 
have to be able to choose between schools, and be willing to switch schools to access higher 
quality education.  School administrators also have to be rewarded for producing the quality 
features that parents demand.  So far, choice initiatives enacted in the U.S. have gone only part 
way toward satisfying these conditions.
2 
Alternatives to the local monopoly model have a much longer history outside the U.S.
3  
In this paper we study competition among elementary schools in Ontario, Canada, which for over 
a century has operated two publicly funded school systems: secular schools (known as public 
schools) that are open to all students, and separate schools that are open to children with 
Catholic backgrounds.
4  The two systems are administered independently and receive equal 
funding per student. 
For non-Catholics, the Ontario system functions like a typical public system in the U.S.  
For the roughly 40% of children with Catholic backgrounds, however, the system is essentially a 
voucher program with two competing suppliers.  Though choice is limited to Catholics, 
competition between the systems can potentially improve the quality of schooling available to all 
students.  Measuring the size of these potential gains is important not only for understanding the 
                                                 
1 See Hanushek (2003) for an overview of trends in school spending and achievement in various countries.  
2 Two main initiatives to loosen the control of local school districts are charter schools and school vouchers.  See  
Hoxby (2004), Booker et al. (2005) Bifulco and Ladd (2004) and Carnoy et al (2005) on the issue of charter schools, 
and Howell and Petersen (2002), Krueger and Zhu (2003) and Ladd (2002) on the issue of vouchers.  
3 Clark (2005) studies the efficiency of English high schools that opt out of local school district control, while 
Gibbons, Machin, and Silva (2006) analyze competition between public schools in England.  Ahlin (2003) studies 
the effects of competition in Sweden.  Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) study the voucher system in Chile.   
4 More precisely, we study the incentives for administrative effort and efficiency when students can choose between 
school systems.  We follow the literature in referring to this as “school competition.” 2 
 
Ontario system, but also for analyzing proposed choice systems in other settings.  The impacts of 
competition in the Ontario system presumably represent a lower bound on the efficiency gains 
that could be realized in a more general system. 
We begin by outlining a simple model of school choice and effort competition between 
public and separate schools.  Assuming that Catholic enrollment in public schools depends on 
the quality gap between the local public and separate schools, and that the managers of the 
competing systems are rewarded for larger market shares, the model implies that equilibrium 
effort will be higher in markets with a larger share of Catholics, and where Catholic parents are 
less committed to a particular environment (religious or secular) at school. 
To identify the neighborhood characteristics that lead to greater incentives for effort 
competition, we study the effects of elementary school openings and closings on enrollment 
trends at nearby schools.  We find that the opening of a new school by the rival system leads to 
enrollment losses of 6-10% over the next three years.  The cross-system losses are approximately 
proportional to the fraction of Catholic families in the area, and are larger in rapidly-growing 
areas where families have weaker ties to specific schools.  
  We then evaluate the effect of enhanced competition on student achievement, using 
standardized tests that are administered province-wide to 3
rd and 6
th graders.  We develop an 
econometric model for the test score gains of a cohort of students at a given school that depends 
on student and local area characteristics, and on an indicator of cross-system competition derived 
from our enrollment growth model.  A key identifying assumption is that variation in the fraction 
of Catholic families in the surrounding neighborhood has no direct effect on test score gains of 
students, though it affects the sensitivity of enrollment demand to relative school quality.  We 
present evidence suggesting that Catholic parents and children have similar characteristics to 3 
 
Protestants, although both groups differ from those with no religious affiliation (who have lower 
parental education and lower student test scores).  Thus, our preferred specifications measure the 
effect of changes in the degree of cross-system competition, holding constant the fractions of 
groups other than Catholics or Protestants.  
  We estimate modest but statistically significant impacts of enhanced effort competition 
on the growth rate of mathematics and reading achievement between 3
rd and 6
th grades.  The 
estimates imply that extending choice to all students in the province would lead to gains in 6
th 
grade reading and mathematics scores on the order of 0.06-0.08 of a standard deviation, with 
larger effects in fast-growing areas.   
 
I.  Previous Research 
  Our work builds on several strands of existing research on school competition, mostly 
focused on the U.S.
5  One important antecedent is research on the role of private school 
competition in increasing public school performance. Couch et al. (1993) related district-wide 
test scores at public schools to the fraction of local students in private schools and interpreted the 
positive correlation as evidence of a competition effect.
6  Hoxby (1994) noted that private school 
enrollment will vary with the quality of local public schools, causing an endogeneity bias in 
Couch et al.’s specification.  Using the fraction of Catholics in a metropolitan area as an 
instrument for private enrollment, Hoxby obtained a positive effect on test outcomes.  
Subsequent instrumental variables (IV) studies (e.g., Arum, 1996, Jepsen, 2003) have found 
weaker effects, and an extensive re-analysis by Jepsen (2002) concludes that the effects of 
private school competition in the U.S. are probably small.  Our research design is similar, 
                                                 
5 See Belfield and Levin (2002) for a comprehensive review of studies of competition in public education in the U.S. 
6 Subsequent studies using the same approach (Newmark, 1995; Sander, 1999; Geller et al. 2006) have found 
generally insignificant effects.  An exception is Dee (1998), who estimates a positive effect on graduation rates.   4 
 
although in our setting Catholic schools are free and readily accessible in virtually all 
neighborhoods in the province.  Moreover, they have the same resources per pupil as public 
schools, and follow the same curriculum.
7  We conjecture that the competitive pressure posed by 
the separate school system (which educates over one-quarter of Ontario students) is greater than 
the pressure from private schools in the U.S. (which only educate 10% of students). 
  A second group of studies examines Tiebout competition between public school districts 
in the same geographic area.  Borland and Howsen (1992) used the Herfindahl index of 
enrollment shares at different school districts as a measure of Tiebout competition and found a 
slightly negative effect on public school test scores.
8  Arguing that district fragmentation is 
endogenous, Hoxby (2000) used the number of rivers and streams running through a 
metropolitan area as an instrument for the Herfindahl index and obtained positive competition 
effects.  Re-analyzing these results, Rothstein (2006a) found smaller and generally insignificant 
effects from a range of alternative specifications.  Rothstein (2006b) found little effect of district 
fragmentation on sorting between districts, suggesting that Tiebout competition is limited.  
  Direct evidence on voucher-based competition comes from a study of Chilean schools by 
Hsieh and Urquiola (2006).  Using comparisons across different municipalities, they found no 
significant relationship between private school entry rates and district-wide gains in student 
outcomes.  Consistent with theoretical analyses by Epple and Romano (1998) and Nechyba 
(2000), however, they find that the introduction of vouchers leads to increased stratification of 
SES-groups across schools. 
                                                 
7 The Ministry of Education publishes detailed specifications for the performance expectations of students by grade 
in all subjects (see Ontario Ministry of Education, 2005).  The standardized tests we use in this paper are designed to 
measure progress toward these objectives. 
8 In an interesting district-level analysis, Millimet and Rangaprasad (2006) test for strategic interactions between the 
input choices of nearby school districts in Illinois, and report positive and generally significant effects of nearby 
competitors’ choices on a district’s choices over pupil/teacher ratios, spending per pupil, and average school size. 5 
 
  A third literature compares the test scores of students at private and public schools.  
Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore (1982) documented that private school students in the U.S. (the 
majority of whom attend Catholic schools) have higher test scores than public school students.  
Cain and Goldberger (1982) cautioned that selectivity biases could account for this gap, and 
subsequent studies have used either Catholic religion, distance to a Catholic school, or the 
interaction of Catholic religion and distance to a Catholic school as instruments for private 
school choice (e.g., Evans and Schwab, 1995; Neal, 1997; Grogger and Neal, 2000; Figlio and 
Ludwig, 2000).  Recently, Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005b) have shown that all three of these 
instruments have a direct correlation with student graduation rates, potentially invalidating the 
IV design.  As discussed below, our identification strategy relies on comparisons between areas 
with different fractions of Catholic families to identify cross-system competition effects.  To 
address the concern raised by Altonji et al.’s findings, we focus on comparisons that vary the 
fraction of Catholics, while holding constant the fraction of groups other than Catholics and 
Protestants in an area.  We establish that in our data and in the sample used by Altonji et al., 
Catholics and Protestants have very similar parental education and test score outcomes, though 
both have better outcomes than families with no religious affiliation.   
 
II. Institutional Detail and Conceptual Framework 
a. Institutional Background 
Two parallel publicly-funded school systems have co-existed in Ontario since 1841. 
Originally both systems were financed by local property taxes, with ratepayers choosing which 
system to support.  A provincial equalization system was introduced in the 1930s, and since 1985 
the Ontario government has provided (roughly) equal funding for all elementary and secondary 6 
 
schools operated by the two systems.
9  Today, Ontario public schools are secular and are legally 
required to accept all students, whereas separate schools restrict enrollment to children of 
Catholic backgrounds.
10  The province is partitioned into overlapping grids of public and 
separate school “boards”.  As of 2003, there were 31 English speaking public school boards 
(with an average enrollment of 44,000) and 29 English speaking separate school boards (with an 
average enrollment of 18,000).  There were also 23 “school authorities” that operated schools in 
remote rural areas, and a handful of French-language school boards.
11 
  Teachers in the two systems are covered by collective bargaining agreements and are 
paid similar salaries.  As noted above, both systems also follow the same standardized 
curriculum.  School construction costs for both systems are financed by a provincial grant 
program that compares enrollment to capacity at the school board level.  Effectively, the 
province operates two “public” school systems, one of which is only available to students with a 
Catholic background.  
 
b. A Simple Model of Enrollment Demand, School Quality, and Managerial Effort 
In this section we present a simple model of enrollment choice by Catholic families. We 
then consider a model of effort determination by the managers of adjacent public and separate 
schools, and show how local market characteristics – including the fraction of Catholic families 
in an area – would be expected to affect the efficiency of schools.   
                                                 
9The equalization system was replaced in 1998 with full provincial funding on a capitation basis. 
10 Separate schools have some discretion in setting the degree of “Catholicism” required for admission, but most 
limit enrollment to baptized Catholics, or the children of a baptized Catholic.  Separate schools can also in principle 
deny admission to students for behavioral or other reasons. 
11 About 5% of students attend private schools that receive no public funding.  We ignore these schools throughout 
this paper. 7 
 
Consider an area with n1 non-Catholic families and n2 Catholic families, each with one 
school-age child.  Assume there are only two schools in the area: a public school with quality Qp 
and a separate school with quality Qs.  (We discuss the case of multiple schools below).  Catholic 
family i associates payoffs Uip and Uis to the choices of the public and separate school, 
respectively, where 
(1a) Uip  =    αip  +   βQp  −  γ tip   +  εip 
(1b) Uis =     αis  +   βQs  −  γ tis   +  εis  . 
Here, αip and αis represent family-specific valuations associated with the choices, tip and tis are the 
travel costs to the schools, and (εip,εis) is a pair of random shocks assumed to be independently 
and identically distributed across the population.
12  Conditional on (αip,αis,Qp,Qs,tip,tis), the 
probability that family i selects the public school is  
 F  [  δi + βΔQ −  γΔti ] , 
where F is the distribution function of the random variable vi=εip−εis, δi= αip-αis is a family-
specific relative taste for public schools,  ΔQ is the quality gap between the schools, and Δti is 
the difference in travel costs to the two schools.   
  Assume that the area can be divided into a set of neighborhoods k=1,2…K, and that all 
families in neighborhood k have the same travel cost differential Δtk.  The share of Catholic 
families in neighborhood k who choose a public school is 
(2) sk(ΔQ, Δtk) =   ∫   F [ δi + βΔQ − γΔtk ] h(δi|k) dδi  , 
                                                 
12 A similar “random utility” formulation is widely used in models of demand for differentiated products.  See Nevo 
(2000) for discussion and references, and Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2006) for an application to school choice.   8 
 
where h(δi|k) represents the density of relative tastes among Catholic families in the 
neighborhood.
13  Letting n2k represent the number of Catholic families in neighborhood k, the 
total fraction of Catholics who choose the public school is 
 s(ΔQ)  ≡   ∑k  n2k/n2  ×  sk(ΔQ, Δtk) . 
Public and separate school enrollments are therefore given by 
(3a) Ep =   n1   +   n2 s(ΔQ),    
 (3b)  Es =    n2  [ 1 − s(ΔQ) ]  . 
  The responsiveness of enrollment in either system to the quality gap between schools is: 
(4)   ∂Ep/∂ΔQ  =  −  ∂Es/∂ΔQ  =   n2 s′(ΔQ) 
        =  n2  ∑k   n2k/n2  ∂sk(ΔQ, Δtk)/∂ΔQ  , 
where 
  ∂sk(ΔQ, Δtk)/∂ΔQ =   β  ∫   f [ δi + βΔQ − γΔtk ] h(δi|k) dδi  , 
and f [ ] is the density associated with F [ ].  The magnitude of ∂sk/∂ΔQ depends on the degree of 
taste heterogeneity among Catholic families.
14  If, at one extreme, the population consists of only 
two types – those who always choose public schools (δi = ∞) and those who never do (δi =–∞) – 
then ∂sk/∂ΔQ =0.   If, on the other hand, δi= δ, then all the Catholic families make the same 
choice and sk(ΔQ) is a step function.  We assume that h(δi|k) lies between these two extremes, 
and is strictly positive on (−∞, ∞). 
  Assume that school quality is an increasing concave function of the level of effort (e) 
exerted by school managers: 
 Q ℓ=q(eℓ),  for ℓ={s,p},  
                                                 
13 As an example, suppose δi is normally distributed with mean δk and variance σ
2 in neighborhood k.  Then  
sk = ∫ σ
–1 F[σ·z+δk+βΔQ−γΔtk]φ(z)dz  where φ(z) is the standard normal density. 
14 More generally, the coefficient β may vary across families.  In this case,  
  ∂sk/∂ΔQ =   ∫∫  βi f[δi + βiΔQ − γΔtk] h(βi,δi|k) dβi dδi   where h(βi,δi|k) is the joint distribution of (βi,δi) in area k. 9 
 
and that the preferences of each manager are represented by a linear function of effort and the 
share of local students attending his or her school: 
 U ℓ(Eℓ, eℓ)  = θ Eℓ/n  −  eℓ , 
where θ>0 reflects the relative weight on market share.
15  The first order conditions for optimal 
effort choices are: 
(5a)   θ (n2/n) s′(ΔQ) q′(ep)  −  1  =  0 
(5b)    θ (n2/n) s′(ΔQ) q′(es)  −  1  =  0  . 
In equilibrium both managers supply the same level of effort e
*, with  
(6)   q′(e
*)  =  1 / [ θ (n2/n) s′(0) ]    . 
Since q′(e) is decreasing in e, equilibrium effort is increasing in (n2/n)s′(0), the derivative of 
market share with respect to the quality gap, evaluated at ΔQ=0.  In particular, since only 
Catholic families have choice, equilibrium effort varies with the local fraction of Catholics, and 
on the willingness of local Catholic families to consider switching systems to access higher 
quality schools.  
 
c. Assessing the Sensitivity of Enrollment Demand to Relative Quality  
  In the absence of direct information on school quality it is difficult to measure the 
reaction of market shares to relative quality.  Assuming enrollment choice is generated by a 
random utility model, however, useful insights can be gained by studying the change in 
enrollment at a given school when the competing system opens or closes a nearby school.  The 
                                                 
15 Equivalently one could assume that managers are rewarded for the number of students they attract.  Friedman’s 
(1955) original voucher proposal was predicated on the idea that managers receive a payoff proportional to the 
number of students they attract.   10 
 
reason is that local demand responses to variation in quality and travel distance are both 
governed by heterogeneity in tastes for a religious versus secular education.
16 
For example, suppose that a new separate school is opened with the same quality as the 
existing separate school.  The predicted change in enrollment at the public school is: 
  ∂Ep/∂Opens  =   n2 ∑k (n2k/n2)  ∂sk(ΔQ, Δtk)/∂Δtk × ∂Δtk/∂Opens   
where ∂Δtk/∂Opens represents the relative change in travel costs in neighborhood k to attend a 
public versus separate school.
17  In neighborhoods that are closer to the new separate school than 
the old one this expression is negative, leading some families to switch systems.  From equation 
(2), however, the responses to change in travel costs and quality are proportional: 
(7)  ∂sk(ΔQ, Δtk)/∂Δtk =   − γ/β ∂sk(ΔQ, Δtk)/∂ΔQ  . 
Thus, the enrollment loss when a nearby school is opened can be expressed as a weighted sum of 
the derivatives of the market shares in each neighborhood with respect to quality: 
(8)  ∂Ep/∂Opens  =   − γ/β   n2 ∑k (n2k/n2)  ∂sk(ΔQ, Δtk )/∂ΔQ × ∂Δtk/∂Opens , 
where the weight, ∂Δtk/∂Opens, depends on the change in relative travel costs experienced by 
families in each neighborhood.  Assuming that the travel cost changes are a function of local 
geography and don’t covary with the distribution of tastes, we can use differences in the 
observed changes in enrollment following nearby openings by the competing system to infer the 
relative sensitivity of enrollment demand to quality.  In particular, neighborhood characteristics 
that are associated with bigger enrollment losses when a competing school is opened nearby 
would be expected to generate more elastic enrollment demand with respect to quality, leading to 
more intensive effort competition. 
                                                 
16 A similar idea is used by Bucklin, Russell, and Srinivasan (1998) to show that the cross-price elasticity of market 
shares for competing brands is proportional to the probabilities of switching between brands. 
17 For simplicity we are assuming that the changes in travel times dΔtk are small enough that the change in  
∫F[δi+βΔQ−γΔtk]h(δi|k)dδi can be approximated by −γdΔtk∫f[δi+βΔQ−γΔtk]h(δi|k)dδi = −γdΔtk ∂sk/∂Δtk. 11 
 
d. Extension and Implementation 
Contrary to our simplified model, the public and separate systems operate multiple 
schools.  Since both systems use attendance zones to assign neighborhoods to specific schools, 
each family’s choice problem is the same as in the simplified two-school case.  The effort-setting 
game is more complicated, however, because in general each school manager competes with 
multiple managers in the opposing system. Nevertheless, as we show in Appendix 1, the 
equilibrium has the same qualitative properties as in the two-school case.  In particular, the 
incentives for effort depend on the local fraction of Catholic students, and on the degree of taste 
heterogeneity among Catholic families for a secular versus Catholic education.  These same 
characteristics also affect the magnitude of the enrollment losses experienced by an existing 
school when the competing system opens a new school nearby.  In the next section we use this 
insight to develop measures of the cross-system competitive pressure in different geographic 
areas.   
   
III. Enrollment Responses to Nearby Openings and Closings 
a. Identification of Openings, Closings, and Affected Schools 
We obtained a file from the Province of Ontario with information on annual enrollments 
by grade at all publicly-funded schools between 1990 and 2004.  Using this file, we define a 
newly opened elementary school as one that has positive enrollment in grades 2-4 in a given year 
(the “opening year”) and zero total enrollment in all previous years.
18  Similarly, we define a 
recently closed elementary school as one with positive enrollment in grades 2-4 in a given year 
                                                 
18 We include “French Immersion” schools as they are offered by the English language school boards.  During the 
1990s there were roughly 2300 public elementary schools and 1100 separate schools in operation in a year. 12 
 
and zero enrollment in the next year (the “closing year”) and all subsequent years.
19   Further 
information is provided in Appendix 2.   
Panel A of Table 1 presents some descriptive information on the opening and closing of 
elementary schools operated by English language school boards.  Over the 15 years of our 
sample period there were 252 openings and 212 closings in the public system and 169 openings 
and 102 closings in the separate school system.  As shown in the second column of the panel, a 
disproportionate share of the events occurred in the second half of our sample period, reflecting a 
major consolidation of school boards in 1998.  Geographically, elementary school openings are 
concentrated in the rapidly growing ring of cities and suburbs around Toronto, while closings are 
concentrated in slower growing rural areas and the inner-city areas of Toronto.  We matched 
schools to Census information tabulated at the neighborhood level (defined by the first three 
characters of the school’s postal code) to compare neighborhoods with openings and closings.  A 
key difference is in the fraction of houses built in the neighborhood between 1991 and 2001, 
which averages 33% for neighborhoods where there were only school openings versus 6% in 
neighborhoods with only school closings.
20   
Our next step is to identify existing schools that were potentially impacted by nearby 
openings and/or closings.  For simplicity, we restrict attention to non-rural affected schools.  We 
started by including all existing schools in a circle around the newly opened or closed school, 
with radius equal to the average travel distance from home to school for students at nearby 
                                                 
19 Schools are sometimes paired together for administrative purposes.  When this occurs both schools are listed as in 
operation, though enrollment is only reported at one of the schools.  We identified “pairing events” and verified their 
status with information from the Ministry of Education.  They are not counted as openings or closings.  
20 See Appendix Table 1. There is also some variation in income and family structure.  Neighborhoods with only 
openings have the highest average income and lowest fraction of single parents, whereas those with only closings 
have the lowest family incomes and the most single parents.   Differences in religious affiliation, education, and 
family size are smaller, although the fraction of immigrants tends to be lower in areas with both openings and 
closings than in other areas, as does the fraction of Catholics. 13 
 
elementary schools (typically around 1 kilometer).
21  We then used satellite images and maps to 
eliminate schools that were separated from the newly opened or closed school by a major travel 
barrier (e.g., a controlled-access highway) – see Appendix 3.  We have checked the sensitivity of 
our results to the inclusion of these “rejected” schools and find similar (though typically weaker) 
evidence of cross-system enrollment flows when they are included.
22 
  The third column in Panel A of Table 1 reports the share of opening and closing events 
for which we were able to identify at least one non-rural affected school.  This ranges from 45 to 
75 percent.  In columns 4 and 5, we report the means and standard deviations of total enrollment 
(for grades 1-6) at the opened and closed schools, classified by whether we can identify at least 
one affected non-rural school.  Typically, a newly opened school has about 320 students in the 
period after opening, while closing schools are smaller.  
  Panel B of Table 1 shows the number of affected schools associated with various 
opening/closing events, and the average distance between the opening/closing school and the 
affected school(s).  Affected schools operated by the competing systems tend to be relatively 
close to the opening/closing schools, suggesting that the opening and closing events have the 
potential to induce at least some students to move between the rival systems. 
Panel C of Table 1 shows the distribution of the number of affected schools for each type 
of opening or closing event.  On average, a school opening affects 2.6 nearby schools, whereas a 
closing affects 3.6 nearby schools.  The smaller number for openings reflects their concentration 
in growing suburban areas with a relatively low density of existing schools.  Closing schools, by 
comparison, tend to be situated in older neighborhoods where schools are closer together.  The 
                                                 
21 We obtained information for one year on the postal codes of all students attending each elementary school in the 
province.  We use the centroids of the postal codes for the schools and the homes to compute travel distances. 
22 We also created a data set that included only the schools near an opening or closing that are excluded from the 
main analysis sample.  The estimated effects of openings and closings on these “excluded” schools are small and 
statistically insignificant.  14 
 
relatively smaller size of closing schools (Panel A) and the fact that each closing affects a larger 
number of nearby schools suggests that the impact per affected school may be smaller than the 
impact of openings.  
 
b. Effects of Nearby Openings and Closings on Enrollment  
 
  Our third step is to estimate the effect of nearby openings and closings on affected 
schools.  Of the roughly 2,600 non-rural elementary schools in the province that were in 
operation for at least two years between 1990 and 2004, 945 were affected by at least one 
opening or closing event and have enrollment data from both before and after the event.
23  Using 
this sample we estimate enrollment models of the form: 
(9)    ∆Esat   =    Xsatb   +  ∑j=1
4  Eventjst × { Ds dj−pub + (1−Ds) dj−sep }   +   αs  +   ωt    +  esat , 
where ∆Esat is a measure of enrollment growth at school s in area a in year t; Xsat is a vector of 
time-varying school and area characteristics; Eventjst is a set of dummies for recent 
opening/closing events at nearby schools that affect this school in year t, Ds is a dummy for a 
public school, αs is a school fixed effect, ωt is a period fixed effect, and esat represents an error 
term.  We identify four types of events -- public openings, separate openings, public closings, 
and separate closings -- and allow separate coefficients (dj−pub and dj−sep) for the effect of each 
event type on nearby public and separate schools.  Note that the models include school fixed 
effects.  Thus, the coefficients measure gains or losses in enrollment in the period following an 
opening or closing event, allowing for school-specific enrollment trends. 
                                                 
23 We exclude middle schools that never had any enrollment below 6
th grade during the sample period.  Combined 
schools that have both grades 1-6 and 7-8 are included in our final sample in any year that they have grades 1 to 6. A 
cross-classification of affected schools by the number of “affecting events” (i.e. nearby openings and closings) is 
presented in Appendix Table 2.  Two-thirds were affected by only one event, and another quarter was affected by 
exactly two events.  Only about 10% were affected by three or more opening/closing events. 15 
 
  Our primary measure of enrollment growth is the percentage change in enrollment from 
grades 1-5 in the previous year to grades 2-6 in the current year.
24  This measure captures any 
systematic losses or gains in enrollment among students who are already attending the school.  
As an alternative we use the change in grade 1 enrollment from the previous year to the current 
year.  This measure is somewhat noisier than the average change in continuing enrollment, 
reflecting fluctuations in the size of the grade 1 entry cohort.  On the other hand, to the extent 
that parents make a “once for all” school choice when their children enter school, the growth in 
first grade enrollment may be more sensitive to changes in the availability of alternative schools. 
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of these two measures.  The first row 
also shows average first-grade enrollments.  A typical public school in our sample has about 50 
first grade students (and similar enrollments at higher grades), while a typical separate school is a 
little smaller (44 students).  Between consecutive years grade 1 enrollment rises at an average 
rate of 1.9% in the public schools and 2.4% in separate schools.  Growth rates vary substantially 
across schools, with a standard deviation of 26% for the public schools and 31% for the separate 
schools.  Average enrollment growth from grades 1-5 to grades 2-6 is smaller (under 1% at both 
public and separate schools), and less variable. 
As explanatory variables in our enrollment growth models we include an indicator for 
whether the school is paired with another school for administrative purposes and a set of 
neighborhood-level characteristics.
25  The latter are based on linear interpolations of 
neighborhood-level Census tabulations from the 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006 Censuses, and 
                                                 
24 Our school level database includes enrollment by grade for each school, as well as the enrollment of ungraded 
students in special education and other programs.  We allocated these students uniformly across all grades offered 
by the school.  For schools that do not offer all grades from 1 to 6, we modify the enrollment measure to reflect only 
those grades for which the school consistently has enrollment.   
25 We have explored specifications that also include whether the school has recently opened (within the last 6 years).  
The results are similar to those reported in this paper.   16 
 
include the shares of the population aged 5-9 and 10-14, the share of recently constructed houses, 
and various demographic characteristics, including the fractions of residents who are Catholic, 
and in different immigrant groups.
26  In addition we use our enrollment database to estimate the 
fractions of children enrolled in public Francophone schools and private schools.  
A key issue for the specification of equation (9) is the lag structure between 
opening/closing events and subsequent enrollment changes at nearby schools.  This is 
particularly important for openings, since new schools often open at reduced capacity and 
expand slowly as facilities are completed.  We investigated this by allowing the dummies for 
nearby events to “turn on” for different lengths of time, and by considering specifications in 
which nearby events cause a permanent shift in the growth rate of enrollment (i.e., the dummies 
remain on indefinitely).  The results showed that the effects of openings and closings on schools 
in the same system emerge quickly, whereas the effects on schools in the competing system take 
at least 3 years to stabilize.  We therefore “turn on” the indicators for nearby events in each of 
the three years following an event, and assume no impact before and after.  Our key findings are 
similar if we allow 4 or 5 year impacts.  
Table 3 shows the estimated effects of school openings on enrollment changes at nearby 
schools in the same and the opposing system from alternative specifications of equation (9).   All 
of the models also include the effect of nearby closings.  As discussed in more detail below, 
however, the cross-system effects of closings are never large, and in the interest of space we 
report the coefficients for the closing effects in Appendix Table 3.  
                                                 
26 Measures on religion were only collected in the 1991 and 2001 Censuses.  Neighborhood tabulations are available 
by so-called “Forward Sortation Area” (FSA) which is based on the first 3 characters of the postal code, and has a 
typical population of about 5,000 households.  In assigning FSA characteristics to schools, we use boundaries as of 
1996, and link FSA’s across Census years using information provided by Statistics Canada.   1991 data are 
unavailable for a few FSAs: in these cases we use data for 1996 to assign information to the period from 1990 to 
1996.  Across 1996, 2001, 2006 there are a few FSAs that have suppressed information for one or more of the 
censuses.  For these FSAs we used the values of measures for the closest FSA with consistent information across all 
FSAs.  Summary statistics on the census measures are provided in Appendix Table 1. 17 
 
Columns 1 and 2 present models that include simple dummy variables for nearby 
openings and closings.  The model in column1 is fit to changes in grade 1 enrollment, while the 
model in column 2 is fit to changes in continuing enrollment between grades 1-5 and 2-6.  The 
coefficients in column 1 suggest that nearby openings lead to first grade enrollment reductions of 
8-9% per year at nearby schools in the same system in each of the three years after the event (i.e., 
a cumulative impact of about 25%).  More important from our perspective are the cross-system 
effects, which are also negative, but about one-third as large.  In particular, we estimate that 
grade 1 enrollment is reduced by 2-3% in each of the following 3 years (or a 6-9% cumulative 
loss) when a nearby school is opened by the competing system.  The opening effects using the 
continuing-cohort enrollment change measure (column 2) are similar, although the cross-system 
effects are a little smaller than for grade 1 students, potentially reflecting the “stickiness” of 
system choice once a student has started school. 
Although not reported in the table, the estimated closing effects from the specifications in 
columns 1 and 2 imply that enrollment rises by 13-20% over the next three years when a nearby 
school in the same system closes.  Unlike openings, however, closings seem to have no effect on 
enrollment at nearby schools in the competing system.   One explanation for this is that parents 
prefer new schools.  In this case, more students will switch systems in response to an opening (to 
access a new school) than to a closing.    To test this explanation we estimated the cross-system 
responses to nearby openings, allowing different impacts at newer schools (less than 5 years old) 
and older schools.  Contrary to our initial expectations the estimates showed somewhat larger 
losses at relatively new schools. 
An alternative explanation is that Catholic families in relatively new neighborhoods – 
where social groups are still in flux, and few families have a connection to existing schools – are 18 
 
most likely to consider switching between systems.  Since openings are concentrated in fast-
growing areas with a higher fraction of new residents, whereas closings are concentrated in 
urban neighborhoods with fewer recent arrivals, the cross-system response of enrollment growth 
to nearby openings will be relatively large, while the cross-system response to closings will be 
small.
27  This hypothesis also explains the tendency for bigger cross-system enrollment losses at 
relatively new schools, since these tend to be located in fast-growing areas. 
To test this explanation we fit a model that allows the effect of nearby openings to vary 
with a simple proxy for the newness of the neighborhood − the growth rate of the housing stock 
over the 1990s, as measured by the fraction of units in 2001 that were built after 1991.
28  The 
results are presented in column 3 of Table 3.
29   The interaction coefficients show that nearby 
openings have larger (i.e., more negative) own-system effects in areas with faster population 
growth, particularly for the public system.
30   The cross-system opening interactions are also 
strongly negative, suggesting that Catholic parents in fast-growing neighborhoods are more 
willing to switch systems when the rival system opens a nearby school.  Interestingly, the 
implied responses in slow-growth areas are essentially zero –comparable to the cross-system 
enrollment flows following school closings.   
Since only Catholic students can switch between school systems, the cross-system 
enrollment losses from nearby openings should also vary with the fraction of Catholics in the 
                                                 
27 An extreme version of this argument is that only newly arriving families consider switching systems.   
28 We have also used an alternative based on local population growth.  This yields qualitatively similar but 
somewhat less precise estimates for the models presented below. 
29 Note that the estimated models in Table 4 include reactions to nearby closings, though for simplicity these are not 
reported in the table. 
30 The mean of the new housing share variable is 0.17, with a range between 0.01 and 0.98, and a standard deviation 
of 0.18. Moreover, the mean new housing share in neighborhoods with school openings about 5 times bigger than in 
neighborhoods with school closings. Thus, the own-system effect of a public opening roughly doubles in magnitude 
as the growth rate of the neighborhood rises from 0 to the mean value. 19 
 
local area.
31   To test this we include interactions of the cross-system opening indicators with the 
fraction of Catholics in the Forward Sortation Area (FSA) in which the school is located.  
Results for four versions of this specification are reported in columns 4-7 of Table 3.   
The specification in column 4 includes both the main effects of cross-system openings, 
and their interactions with the local fraction of Catholics.  Judging by the sampling errors of the 
estimates from this model we do not have enough power to separately identify the main opening 
effects and the interaction terms.  To improve precision, we fit the restricted model reported in 
column 5 that excludes the main effects.  This specification imposes the prediction of our 
theoretical model that the opening responses are proportional to the fraction of Catholics in the 
area, and fits as well as the less restrictive model.  The magnitudes of the coefficients suggest 
that in very-high Catholic areas, the cross-system reactions to nearby openings are relatively 
large – on the order of one-half the magnitude of the own-system responses. 
The model in column 6 of Table 3 allows the cross effects to vary with both the local 
Catholic share and the growth rate of the local housing stock.  Echoing the results in column 3, 
the triple interaction terms (in rows 8 and 12) are large in magnitude and statistically significant, 
whereas the two-way interactions of the Catholic share with the opening indicator (in rows 7 and 
11) are small.  Our final specification in column 7 therefore drops the Catholic interactions and 
includes only the triple interactions of Opening×Catholic Share×Share of New Housing.  This 
model fits as well as the preceding one, and implies that in a neighborhood with a growth rate of 
0.33 (the mean for neighborhoods with only openings) and a 40% Catholic share, the opening of 
a new school by the competing system leads to cumulative enrollment losses of 4-11 percent at 
nearby existing schools.  In areas with a greater share of Catholics or faster population growth, 
                                                 
31 Strictly speaking this is only true if the distribution of preferences for secular versus Catholic education among 
Catholic families does not vary with the local fraction of Catholics. 20 
 
the reactions are bigger, whereas in areas with few Catholics, or negligible growth, the reactions 
are essentially 0.  Holding constant area characteristics, the measured cross-system enrollment 
responses to a nearby opening are larger at public schools than separate schools, although we 
cannot reject equality at conventional significance levels.  
 
IV. Impacts of Competition on Student Achievement 
a. Modeling the Effect of Effort Competition on Student Achievement  
  The second step in our empirical analysis is to relate the degree of competition between 
systems to the academic achievement of students.  Our achievement measures are based on 
standardized tests written by students in the 3
rd and 6
th grades.  Building on the existing 
education production function literature (e.g., Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 2005) we assume that 
the test score of student i in grade g 0{3,6} who attends school s in area a depends on his or her 
observed characteristics Xisa, on school characteristics Zsa (including an indicator for whether the 
school is public or separate), on the characteristics of the local area Wa, on a measure of cross-
system competitive pressure in the area, Ia, and on unobserved ability and random factors egisa: 
(10) Tgisa  =   Xgisabgx   +  Zsabgz   +  Wabgw   +  IabgI  +  egisa . 
Note that in this specification local competitive pressure is a “market” characteristic that affects 
the achievement of all students – not just those who attend a specific school or subset of schools.  
Note too that the coefficients in equation (10) are all grade-specific.  In particular, assuming that 
learning depends on the duration of exposure to the school environment, and that competitive 
pressure leads to a better environment, we expect that b6I>b3I.   
  Because of neighborhood sorting, unobserved student abilities are likely to be correlated 
with school and neighborhood characteristics, leading to biases in OLS estimation of (10).  When 21 
 
longitudinal student data are available the conventional solution is to estimate the model in first 
differences (e.g., Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 2005).  Since we cannot link 3
rd and 6
th grade test 
takers in our data base, we follow an alternative approach of including school×cohort fixed 
effects and entering the time-invariant school and neighborhood variables as interactions with an 
indicator for test takers in 6
th grade (Gr6ig): 
(11) Tgisa = Xgisabgx + ZsaGr6ig bz + WaGr6ig bw + IaGr6ig bI + ξcoh(i),s + e′gisa . 
In this specification ξcoh(i),s represents a fixed effect for the cohort of students who were in third 
grade at school s at the same time as student i (or in 6
th grade at the same school 3 years later), 
and e′gisa represents the unexplained component of student i’s score in grade g.   In the presence 
of cohort×school fixed effects, we can only identify the differential (or “value-added”) effects of 
the time-invariant variables.  Thus, the coefficient on the competitive index is bI=b6I−b3I, with 
similar expressions for bz and bw . 
  If all students remain at the same school between 3
rd and 6
th grades, estimates based on 




32  In the presence of student mobility, however, the two approaches will yield 
different estimates.  For consistent estimation of the value-added coefficients using (11), any 
difference in average abilities between the leavers and joiners at a school must be uncorrelated 
with the observed covariates.
33  We maintain this assumption throughout our analysis. 
  A second key assumption is that our measures of competitive pressure are orthogonal to 
unobserved determinants of achievement growth.  Based on the analysis in Table 3 we use two 
measures of local competitive pressure.  The first is just the fraction of Catholic families in an 
area.   The second is the product of the local fraction of Catholics and the growth rate of the local 
                                                 
32 This assumes that the first differenced specification includes grade-specific coefficients for the time-varying 
individual X’s. 
33 A differenced model, by comparison, requires that school leavers are as good as randomly selected. 22 
 
area.  Since we do not observe the religion of individual test takers, either of these choices poses 
a potential problem if Catholic children have systematically different test score gains than other 
students.  We study this issue in detail in subsection c., below. 
 
b. Test Score Data 
  In 1998 Ontario introduced province-wide testing for all students in publicly funded 
schools in grades 3, 6, and 9.  We use test results for 3
rd and 6
th grade students from 1998 to 
2005, allowing us to track 5 cohorts of students, starting with children who were in 3
rd grade in 
1997-98, and ending with those in 3
rd grade in 2001.
34   We have data for roughly 65,000 public 
school students and 32,000 separate school students in each cohort.  
The test data file has a limited set of individual characteristics, including gender, whether 
a student is classified as “exceptional” (i.e., special needs) or “gifted” (i.e., advanced), whether 
he or she attended kindergarten, and whether he/she is enrolled in an English-as-a-Second-
Language (ESL) or French Immersion program.  (We do not know whether a student is 
Catholic).  Means for these characteristics by grade and public versus separate school status are 
shown in the upper rows of Table 4.   There are some small but statistically significant 
differences between students in the two systems.  For example, separate school students are a 
little more likely to have attended kindergarten, are less likely to be classified as exceptional or 
gifted, and are less likely to be enrolled in ESL or French Immersion. 
  We limit our analysis sample to children in school-cohort groups that have at least 10 test 
takers in both 3
rd and 6
th grades.  We also compare the number of test takers in a cohort in 3
rd and 
                                                 
34 The tests are administered by the Education Quality and Accountability Office (EQAO). EQAO will not release 
test records for schools with fewer than 15 students enrolled in the grade of the test.  Thus, our analysis does not 
include those schools with low enrollments.  While many of these smaller schools are located in rural areas, some 
are special alternative schools located in urban areas. 23 
 
6
th grades, and eliminate groups for which the ratio is greater than 1.4 or less than 0.71(=1/1.4).
35  
Our final sample includes 65-70% of all public school test takers and a higher fraction (85-96%) 
of all separate school test takers.  These students are drawn from approximately 9000 school-
cohort groups who attended 2000 different schools. 
  Summary statistics for the test outcomes of the analysis sample are presented in the 
bottom rows of Table 4.
36  We show mean test scores by grade and public/separate school status 
for the three main test components: reading, mathematics, and writing.  The test results are 
reported on a relatively coarse scale of 1-4, with 4 representing the top score.
37  The mean test 
score is typically around 2.6 while the standard deviation ranges from 0.6 to 0.8.  Mean test 
scores are quite similar in the two systems.  This is quite different than the situation in the U.S., 
where students at Catholic schools have substantially higher scores than those at public schools.  
The difference is presumably attributable to the very different selectivity of Catholic school 
attendees when the schools are free (as in Ontario) than not (as in the U.S.).   Reflecting this 
difference, the fraction of Catholic children in Ontario who attend separate schools is also 
relatively high (65% on average). 
  
c.  Differences Between Catholic and non-Catholic Families 
  As noted above, a key assumption in our research design is that students in areas with a 
higher or lower fraction of Catholics have similar unobserved factors that affect achievement 
growth.  While the similarity of the test outcomes in public and separate schools in Table 4 is 
                                                 
35 We have estimated our main models using samples with different exclusion rules and find that the coefficients 
estimates are similar, though typically a little smaller in absolute value, when we retain school-cohorts with a wider 
range of variation in the number of test takers.   
36 Appendix Table 4 shows the mean test score outcomes for the overall samples of test takers, and presents some 
information on the fractions of students whose scores are missing.  Many of the missing observations are attributable 
to exceptional students, who are not required to take the test.  
37 This limited scale poses a potential attenuation problem, although the fraction of students coded with the 
minimum score is less than 10% while the fraction coded with the top score is less than 15%.   24 
 
broadly consistent with this assumption, we cannot directly test it because we do not observe the 
religious affiliation of test-takers.  Instead, we turn to two other data sources.  The first is the 
2001 Canadian Census, which includes information for a relatively large sample of Ontario 
residents on education, earnings, and religious affiliation.
38  Since parental education is a 
powerful predictor of test scores (see e.g., Jencks and Phillips, 1998), any differences in the 
education of Catholic versus non-Catholic parents would indicate a problem for our research 
design.  Likewise, since wages are strongly affected by cognitive skills (Murnane, Willet, and 
Levy, 1995), comparisons of earnings potentially reveal differences in cognitive skills of parents 
that may be correlated with those of their children.   Our second data source is the National 
Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS), which interviewed children in 8
th grade in 1988 
and followed them for the next two decades.  Although NELS is U.S.-based, it has the advantage 
of including test score information at different ages, as well as detailed information on family 
background and religion. 
  Table 5 presents comparisons of education and wages by religious affiliation for Ontario 
parents in the 2001 Census. We present models in which the years of education or log weekly 
wages of a parent are regressed on dummies for religious affiliation, Census Metropolitan Area 
(CMA, the lowest level of geography identified in the public use file), and country of origin.  
The set of controls is relatively parsimonious, reflecting the controls that we include in our test 
score models (see below).  The odd-numbered columns of Table 5 present models that include 
only a dummy for Catholic religion.  In these models Catholics are compared to all other parents, 
including Protestants (about 35% of parents), those with no religious affiliation (about 15% of 
parents), and those with religious affiliations other than Protestant or Catholic (18% of parents).  
                                                 
38 The public use files of the 2001 Canadian census do not allow users to construct families.  We classify as 
“parents” individuals between the ages of 24 and 62 who are either the head or spouse of the head of the household 
for a household with at least one child under the age of 16. 25 
 
The specifications in the even-numbered columns include dummies for people affiliated with 
other religions and those with no affiliation.  In these models Catholics are directly compared to 
Protestants.  Looking across the columns, the estimates show that Catholic parents have a 
(modest) education and wage advantage relative to other parents as a whole, but are statistically 
indistinguishable from Protestant parents. 
  A very similar pattern holds with respect to test score outcomes of children in the NELS.  
Table 6 presents models for 8
th grade test score outcomes of NELS students, and for their test 
score gains between 8
th and 10
th grade.
39   We present results for all students (in columns 1-4) 
and for the subset who were attending public schools in 8
th grade (columns 5-8).  The latter 
group is particularly interesting because few of them attend Catholic high schools (Altonji, 
Elder, and Taber, 2005a, 2005b).  Thus, differences in test score gains between 8
th and 10
th grade 
arguably measure the direct impact of a Catholic family background, rather than a combination 
of family background effects and Catholic schooling effects.  
  As shown by the estimates in columns 1 and 5, when Catholics are compared to all other 
children, they have significantly higher 8
th grade test scores.  Likewise, the models in columns 3 
and 7 show faster test score gains between 8
th and 10
th grade.  When the comparison group is 
narrowed to Protestants, however, the differences are much smaller and uniformly statistically 
insignificant.  Thus, it appears that Catholic and Protestant children in the NELS have about the 
same test score levels and gains, whereas both groups do better than children with other religions 
or no religious affiliation, or who fail to report their affiliation.
40   
                                                 
39 NELS also has test scores in 12
th grade, but a much larger fraction of students (25%) have missing test data.  
40 We have fit a wide variety of alternative models to the NELS data, including models that are fit by weighted OLS, 
using cross-sectional or panel weights, and models for 10
th grade scores that include 8
th grade scores on the right 
hand side.  These models yield very similar results to the specifications reported in Table 6.  Models for parental 
education in the NELS sample yield results that are quite similar to those in Table 5, though Catholic fathers have 
somewhat higher education than Protestant fathers.  One important difference between Protestants in Canada and the 
U.S. is the higher fraction of “non-mainstream” Protestants in the U.S. When we fit models including separate 26 
 
  Overall, we interpret the test score results from NELS as confirming the conclusions from 
Table 5.  In particular, Catholic children in Ontario and in the US appear to have similar family 
background characteristics and similar test scores to Protestants.  Both groups have better family 




d. Models for Test Score Outcomes 
  Table 7 presents estimation results for four alternative specifications of equation (11), fit 
separately to individual scores in reading, mathematics, and writing.  In addition to the 
explanatory variables listed in the table, the models include a dummy for 6
th grade test takers, 
and 8 student-level controls (gender, ESL status, French immersion status, gifted or exceptional 
status, a dummy for kindergarten attendance, and dummies for unknown gender and kindergarten 
attendance).  These variables are all entered with grade-specific coefficients.  We also include 
school-cohort means of the student variables, along with the mean fraction of the group with 
missing test scores and the fraction with a missing score who are coded as exceptional, all 
interacted with an indicator for grade 6.  In addition, the models include the fraction of 
immigrants in the FSA, and the fractions in the FSA who report East Asian, South Asian, 
Northern European, Southern European, and Eastern European ethnicity, all interacted with 
grade 6 status.
42  The models include school×cohort fixed effects, with estimated standard errors 
“clustered” by school to allow for arbitrary correlation across the students from any one school. 
                                                                                                                                                             
coefficients for Baptists and Pentecostals, Catholic children have lower test scores than mainstream Protestants, and 
their parents have lower education than those of mainstream Protestants.  
41 See Lehrer (2005) for a review of evidence from the U.S. which generally concludes that religious affiliation has a 
positive effect on schooling outcomes. 
42 As Canada is historically comprised of immigrants from the United Kingdom and France, we exclude ethnicities 
affiliated with these countries from our European ethnic measures.  In addition, we include Southern European 
countries previously aligned with Russia under the Eastern European ethnic grouping. 27 
 
  Columns 1, 5 and 9 present a basic model that uses the local fraction of Catholics as an 
indicator of competitive pressure.  The estimated coefficients are statistically significant and 
suggest that 6
th grade scores in reading and writing are about 0.06 points higher, and scores in 
math are about 0.12 points higher, in a 60% Catholic neighborhood than in a 20% Catholic 
neighborhood, holding all else constant.  Since the standard deviations of 6
th grade scores across 
students are approximately 0.75, these represent effect sizes of 7-16% of a standard deviation.   
  The models in columns 2, 6, and 10 include both the local fraction of Catholics and the 
fraction of Catholics interacted with the share of new housing in the neighborhood as indicators 
of competitive pressure.  Consistent with the pattern in our enrollment growth models, the 
estimates for the interaction term suggest that competitive pressure is much stronger in newer 
neighborhoods.  The specifications in columns 3, 7, and 11 exclude the Catholic share variable – 
a restriction that is not rejected at conventional significance levels for the reading or writing 
models but is rejected in the mathematics model.  Again, all three estimates of the competition 
effect are highly statistically significant.  To interpret the magnitude of the estimated effects, 
consider the 0.39 coefficient estimate from the reading score model.  Comparing an area with a 
60% Catholic share and a 20% new housing share (close to the sample average) to an area with 
the same new housing share but only 20% Catholics, reading scores in 6
th grade are increased by 
0.03 points, or an effect size of 4% of a standard deviation.  The implied effect in a relatively 
new neighborhood (35% new housing share) is 7% of a standard deviation.  The predicted effects 
for writing scores are similar while the effects for mathematics are 75% larger. 
  Our investigation of differences between Catholics and non-Catholics suggested that 
Catholic parents and children are very similar to Protestants, but both groups are advantaged 
relative to families with other religious affiliations, or no affiliation.  In view of this finding, we 28 
 
added two additional controls to the models in columns 4, 8, and 12: the fraction of people in the 
FSA who express no religious affiliation, and the fraction affiliated with religions other than 
Protestant or Catholic (i.e., Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, etc.).  In these models, the effect of local 
competition is identified by variation in the fraction of Catholics relative to Protestants, holding 
constant the fractions with other religion and no religion.  Provided that Catholic and Protestant 
children have similar unobserved determinants of test score growth (as appears to be true in the 
NELS), estimates from these models will provide consistent estimates of any competition effect. 
  The addition of these two controls attenuates the coefficient of our competition indicator 
slightly in the models in reading and writing, and somewhat more for mathematics, though all 
three coefficients remain significant at conventional levels.  Consistent with the models for 
NELS test outcomes, a higher local fraction of people who report no religious affiliation is 
associated with slower test score gains, particularly in mathematics.  By comparison the effects 
of the share of families with religious affiliations other than Protestant or Catholic are slightly 
positive, but not statistically significant.  Interpreting the magnitudes of the competition effects, a 
rise of 40 percentage points in the fraction of children with choice between the systems is 
associated with 6
th grade test outcomes that are 4-5% of a standard deviation higher in a 
neighborhood with an average share of new houses. 
  In keeping with the simple symmetric model outlined in Section II, the specifications in 
Table 7 all assume that local competitive pressure has the same effect on test score gains of 
students at public and separate schools.   In a more general model in which the incentives for 
gaining market share are different in the two systems, however, the effects of local competitive 
pressure could be different.  To test this possibility, we re-estimated the specifications from 
columns 4, 8 and 12 of Table 7, allowing the impacts of local competitive to vary for test takers 29 
 
at public and separate schools.   In the model for reading scores the coefficient of local Catholic 
share×new housing share is 0.49 (standard error =0.18) for students at public schools, and 0.35 
(standard error=0.15) for students at separate schools.  In the model for mathematics scores the 
corresponding coefficients are 0.73 (standard error =0.27) for students at public schools and 0.50 
(standard error=0.21) for students at separate schools, while in the model for writing the 
coefficients are 0.33 (standard error =0.14) for public school students and 0.26 (standard 
error=0.12) for separate school students.  In all three cases the implied effects of competitive 




  Most families in Ontario live within a short distance of competing public and separate 
elementary schools.  Figure 1, for example, shows the locations of schools included in our test-
taker data base from the area west of Toronto.  The density of the competing networks suggests 
there is at least a potential for cross-system competition for children of Catholic backgrounds.  
We interpret the results in Table 7 as suggesting that this competition leads to improved test 
outcomes for students in both types of schools.  The pattern of competition effects – higher in 
faster growing areas, and proportional to the local fraction of Catholics – is consistent with direct 
evidence on the enrollment impacts of nearby school openings, suggesting that the effects are 
driven by the incentives identified in our theoretical model.  Importantly, the estimated 
competitive effects are robust to controlling for the fraction of people with no religious 
affiliation, or affiliations other than Protestant or Catholic.  Nevertheless, the implied effects are 
relatively modest: a shift between areas where 20% of students can choose between systems to 30 
 
one where 60% can choose is associated with a gain in 6
th grade test scores of about 4-5% of a 
standard deviation. 
  A limitation of our analysis is that we have no direct evidence on the actual mechanisms 
through which competition affects test scores.  We note, however, that school-level average 
scores are widely reported in the media, and available from real estate agents and other sources 
(e.g., http://www.theschoolguy.com).  There is also anecdotal evidence that teachers and 
principals are under pressure to raise scores.  One possible mechanism for improved efficiency is 
through the allocation of principals and vice principals.  To examine this link we tracked the 
identifiers for principals at each elementary school and tested whether principals tend to turn 
over more at schools affected by a nearby opening by the competing system in areas with a 
higher fraction of Catholic residents.  The results did not show any systematic pattern, though 
clearly principal turnover is a very crude indicator of managerial input. 
  It is also worth noting two other limitations of our analysis.  First, we can only measure 
test score gains over 3 years, or one-quarter of the time that most students spend in school.  If 
similar effects were present at all stages of elementary and secondary schooling the benefits of 
competition would be commensurately greater.  Second, it is possible that in more competitive 
markets teachers and principals spend more time and effort preparing for standardized tests, and 
less on other aspects of learning.  If “test skills” have limited intellectual value, the effort 
devoted to competing over test outcomes is socially wasteful, and the higher test score gains 
observed in more competitive markets may be counter-productive.   
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VI. Summary and Conclusions 
Can a reduction in the monopoly power of local school districts improve the efficiency of 
publicly-funded education?  In this paper we try to answer this question by studying the effects 
of school competition in Ontario, Canada, which for over a century has operated two publicly 
funded school systems: “public schools” that are open to all students, and “separate schools” that 
are limited to children with Catholic backgrounds.  The fraction of families who can exercise 
choice between the competing systems varies widely across different areas of the province, 
providing the basis for our research design.   
We develop a simple model of school choice and effort competition between public and 
separate schools.  In the model, the share of Catholic children enrolling in public schools 
depends on the relative quality of local public and separate schools, on their relative proximity, 
and on underlying tastes for a religious or secular school environment.  Assuming that school 
managers are rewarded for larger market shares, equilibrium effort in both systems will be higher 
in markets with a larger share of Catholics who are willing to switch systems to access higher 
school quality.  The model also implies that we can infer the relative responsiveness of families 
to school quality by measuring the fraction who “switch brands” (Bucklin, Russell, and 
Srinivasan, 1998) when a nearby school is opened by the rival system. 
We use a comprehensive panel of elementary schools to measure the characteristics of 
schools and areas that lead to greater sensitivity of enrollment to changes in the nearby schools 
operated by the competing school system.  We find that enrollment losses following a nearby 
school opening by the competing system are proportional to the share of Catholic families in the 
area, and are higher in rapidly-growing areas, where families are arguably less attached to a 
particular school. 32 
 
We then analyze data for five cohorts of students who wrote province-wide standardized 
tests in reading, mathematics, and writing in grades 3 and 6.  We model test outcomes using a 
value-added framework that relates the gains in scores for a cohort of student in a given school to 
characteristics of the students, the school, and the local area.  In particular, we focus on the 
impact of cross-system competitive pressure, measured by the local fraction of Catholics and the 
interaction of this with a measure of the growth rate of housing in the area.   
A key concern is that changes in the local fraction of Catholic families may have an 
independent effect on students’ academic achievement.  Since our test data lack information on 
religious affiliation, we use two other data sets – the 2001 Census, which contains data on 
educational attainment and earnings for a large sample of Ontario parents, and the National 
Education Longitudinal Study (NELS), which reports test score levels and changes for a large 
sample of children in the U.S.  We find that Catholic parents and children are very similar to 
Protestants, but both groups are advantaged relative to families with other religious affiliations, 
or no affiliation.  Thus, in our preferred specifications we control for the local fractions of people 
with no religious affiliation, or affiliations to religions other than Protestant or Catholic.   
Our models show statistically significant but relatively modest effect of enhanced 
competition on the test score gains of local students.  Comparing markets where only 20 percent 
of children have choice to markets where 60 percent can choose between systems, we estimate 
that test scores in 6
th grade are 0.04-0.05 of a standard deviation higher, relative to 3
rd grade 
scores.  The implied impacts are higher in rapidly growing areas and smaller in slow-growth 
areas.  Consistent with a “market competition” effect, we find that test scores of students in both 
the public and separate systems are higher in areas with more competitive pressure, with 
somewhat larger impacts on public school students.  33 
 
Our findings have at least three implications for education policy.  First, we have shown 
that a significant fraction of families are willing to move between publicly-funded schools to 
access a combination of higher quality or more convenient schools.  This willingness to move 
provides the basis for cross-system competition that can lead, at least in principle, to improved 
efficiency of publicly-funded schools.  Our estimates suggest competition has a modest positive 
effect on student achievement:  extending choice to all students would lead to gains in 6
th grade 
test scores of 6-8% of a standard deviation.  Finally, our results underscore the critical 
importance of further research on the links between parental choice decisions and the incentives 
faced by competing school systems.   34 
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Appendix 1:  Multiple Schools Equilibrium 
 
This appendix extends the model developed in the text to the case where there are 
multiple schools operated by each of the two competing systems.  To simplify notation, define a 
neighborhood by the identity of its assigned schools: thus students in neighborhood (j,k) can 
attend either public school j or separate school k.   Let n2jk represent the number of Catholic 
students in neighborhood (j,k) and let  
 s jk(ΔQjk, Δtjk) = ∫ F[ δi + βΔQjk  − γΔtjk ] h(δi|j,k) dδi   
represent the share of these students who attend public school j, given the quality differential 
ΔQjk and relative travel costs Δtjk.  Public school j’s attendance zone includes n1j non-Catholic 
students and n2j = Σk n2jk Catholic students (with similar expressions for separate school k).  
Total enrollment at public school j is therefore 
 E j =   n1j   +  n2j  Σk n2jk/n2j  sjk(ΔQjk, Δtjk) , 
while total enrollment at separate school k is 
 E k =  n2k  Σj n2jk/n2k  (1–sjk(ΔQjk, Δtjk)) . 
  Assuming that school quality depends on managerial effort as before, and that school 
managers have the same objective function specified earlier, the first order condition for the 
effort choice of the manager of the j
th public school is 
(A1)  θ (n2j/nj) { Σk (n2jk/n2j) ∂sjk(ΔQjk, Δtjk)/∂ΔQ }  q′(ej)   −   1  =  0  , 
while the corresponding condition for the manager of the k
th separate school is 
(A2)  θ (n2k/nk) { Σj (n2jk/n2k) ∂sjk(ΔQjk, Δtjk)/∂ΔQ } q′(ek)   −   1  =  0  . 
As a benchmark, consider the case in which: (i) the distribution of tastes is the same in all 
neighborhoods (i.e., h(δi|j,k)= h(δi));  (ii) relative travel costs are the same in all neighborhoods 39 
 
(i.e., Δtjk= Δt); (iii) the relative fraction of Catholic students is constant and equal to n2/n across 
all neighborhoods.  Under these conditions, 
sjk(ΔQjk, Δtjk) = s(ΔQjk, Δt)  ≡  ∫ F[δi + βΔQjk − γΔt] h(δi)dδi , 
and the effort game has a symmetric equilibrium with ej= ek=e
*, where e
* satisfies the condition 
(A3)  θ (n2/n) ∂s(0, Δt)/∂ΔQ  q′(e
*)  –   1   =  0. 
This is the same as the equilibrium condition in the two-school case given by equation (6) in the 
text.  
More generally, in a multi-school setting the incentives for effort of the manager of a 
given school depend on the fraction of students in the catchment area who can potentially move 
to the other system, and on a weighted average of the derivatives of the enrollment share in each 
neighborhood with respect to relative school quality (i.e., Σk (n2jk/n2j) ∂sjk(ΔQjk, Δtjk)/∂ΔQ).  As 
in the simpler two-school setting, this derivative is closely related to the sensitivity of enrollment 
to a change in the number of nearby schools operated by the competing system.  In particular, 
using a slight modification of equations (7) and (8) it is easy to show that schools with market 
shares that are more sensitive to quality will lose more students when the opposing system opens 
a new school nearby.   40 
 
Appendix 2: Construction of Schools and Test Score Data 
 
 
All data on Ontario schools were obtained from the Ministry of Education under several 
Freedom of Information Requests. The following basic school information was provided: school 
identification number, school name, school type, board affiliation, and last known address.
43
 This 
information was requested for all schools that were in existence at any point from 1990 to the 
present. From this information, we identified a set of publicly funded, English speaking public 
and separate schools. This set of schools includes French Immersion programs in English 
speaking schools. From this set of schools, we excluded any school that we could identify as 
being a school operated for the mentally ill, prisons, and other types of special populations.
44
 
For each school year, the Ministry provided enrollments for each grade based on the fall 
enrollment reports the schools were required to complete. From these enrollment figures we 
identified the set of schools for which a school had positive enrollment for one or more grades 
between 1st and 6th grades during the sample period. 
Identification of an Opening or Closing 
We tracked openings and closings of schools that offer grades 2, 3, and/or 4 in the 
opening or closing year.
45
 To be classified as an opening school, enrollment in these grades must 
be positive in a given year (the “opening year”) and total enrollment must be zero in previous 
years.  Similarly, to be classified as a closing school, enrollment in grades 2, 3, and/or 4 must be 
positive in a given year and total enrollment must be zero in the next year (the “closing year”) 
and all subsequent years. We ignore schools that open and close in the same year (i.e., only have 
                                                 
43 If a school moved locations during the period under study, we do not observe the move. 
44 In the data cleaning process we excluded the following types of schools: schools whose address is located outside 
of the province; schools whose primary population are prisoners or infirmed individuals; schools that only offer 
kindergarten; schools on First Nation reserves; schools that never report a positive enrollment. 
45 This results in our excluding from an analysis “middle” schools that open or close during the sample period. In 
Ontario, most schools offer all grades between 1st and 8th grade. 41 
 
positive enrollment in a single calendar year). Note that schools that expand or contract their 
grade offerings are not treated as opening or closing. Similarly, in a few situations, schools are 
paired together for administrative purposes. When this occurs provincial records show that both 
schools remain in operation but enrollment for the two is reported at only one of the schools. We 
identified these “pairing events” and validated their status with information from the Ministry of 
Education. We ignore enrollment changes arising from pairing events in the identification of an 
opening or closing. 
Special considerations: 
  Schools that change grades. There are a few schools that add or drop grades over 
time. Because these schools were in existence and continue to be in existence we do 
not treat them as openings or closings.  
 
  There are some schools that close, remain closed for several years and then reopen. 
After confirming that the school has not been an annexed school in the intervening 
years (effectively remaining open during the period it appears to have been closed), 
we treat these events as separate events. We identified the following three events:  
o  School closed in 1991 and then reopened in 1995.  
o  School closed in 1993 and reopened in 1999. 
o  School closed in 1995 and reopened in 1997. 
 
  There are a few schools that appear to close in one year and within the next two years 
another school opens in the same location. Depending on changes in enrollments we 
either classify the schools as separate events or assume the events represent more of a 
“name” change than a true closing and opening. We identified seven sets of events 
that we concluded should not be treated as either closing or opening events.  
 
  If a school slowly opens or slowly closes (e.g. increases/decreases the grades 
offered), we will modify the enrollment figures used in our analysis to reflect the 
change in enrollment for the appropriate cohorts of students (e.g. if a school opens 
and initially offers grades 1-3 but then expands to include grades 4-6, we will 
measure the change in enrollment to reflect enrollments for grades 1-3 in year t-1 and 
grades 2-4 in year t) if that school is used in the analysis (it is affected by another 
school that opens or closes). The year used to identify the opening or closing, 




Linking of school data to test scores 
Beginning in school year 1998, all publicly funded schools were required to participate in the 
testing of students in grades 3 and 6 using a test instrument developed by the Educational Quality 
and Accountability Office (“EQAO”). The EQAO tests were designed to help schools and school 
boards obtain a better understanding of the effectiveness of the curriculum on obtaining student 
achievement. To date, performance on the EQAO test does not formally affect a school’s budget. 
The test is given in the spring of each academic year. For each of three components mathematics, 
reading, and writing), a student is scored on a scale of 1-4. Over time the duration and other 
aspects of the test have changed. The scale, however, has remained constant with 1 representing 
a well below expectations and 4 representing an exceeds expectation score. 
For schools with more than 15 students, we obtained through a series of Freedom of 
Information requests student level data that contain information on student characteristics and 
performance on the three components of the test (mathematics, reading, and writing). We were 
provided with records for all students that should have sat the EQAO test. Thus, we were 
provided with records of students who only sat for part of the test and who did not sit for any of 
the test. To help control for issues of selection bias from students that might not have randomly 
not sat the exam, we were able to identify for each grade and school the share of test takers with 
no test score and whether these test takers were identified as receiving special education status.
46
 
We compared the number of potential test takers by grade with the fall enrollment figures 
we had for the schools. Given the enrollment figures were obtained in the fall and the test was 
administered in the spring, we expected there to be some slippage in the enrollment and test taker 
counts. In instances where there was a substantial discrepancy in these counts, we investigated 
                                                 
46 Over time, the method used to classify students as receiving special education has changed slightly. For each test 
year we attempted to use a consistent method for identifying these students given these constraints. For more 
information on how we addressed and various other issues on student characteristics, please contact the authors. 43 
 
the data further. In some instances the school’s unique identifier was miscoded. Because we were 
given the name of the school, we were able to use hand checking to identify the appropriate 
school number to use in order to match the test level data with the school level data. 
As explained in more detail in the paper, we observed that some schools had dramatically 
low numbers of students for whom we observe a test score. To refine our estimation, we 
excluded schools with a high number of non-test takers. 
Linking of school data to Census and location measures 
For each school we were given the last known address. We used the first three characters 
of the postal code to identify the “Forward Sortation Area” (FSA) of the school. Using the FSA 
we then matched census data from 1991, 1996, and 2001 to schools. If the current FSA did not 
exist for earlier years, we identified the FSA that most likely was covered historically and used 
census measures across all three periods that corresponded to the area covered by the school for 
all three census years. In some instances the FSA census data were suppressed and/or it was clear 
that the area covered by the FSA did not represent the area that was likely to be the school’s 
catchment area. This usually occurred in rural areas where there was a small town that had a 
distinct FSA from the rural parts. We used the census measures for the broader area when it was 
clear that a school’s enrollment included families residing in both the rural area and the small 
town. 
For each school address, we used data provided by researchers at Carleton University to 
identify the longitude and latitude of each school location. If instances where the school address 
as given as a post office box, we used the longitude and latitude for the centroid of the postal 
code. For more information on the data from this source, please see www.geocoder.ca. 44 
 
Appendix 3: Construction of Circle Data Set 
 
For each opening and closing school we constructed a “pre-defined” circle based on the 
average distance traveled by students to schools in the area.
47  We then refined the circle by 
excluding schools that were identified to be within the circle for which there is a physical 
obstacle preventing it from being a reasonable competitor.  These obstacles include expressways, 
ravines, and industrial/commercial areas. We also included schools that were outside of the pre-
defined circle if it appeared that the school was close enough to the opening/closing school to be 
a potential competitor.  Our judgments were based on an examination of detailed satellite images 
that mapped the school addresses.  In instances where the satellite image was unclear and/or the 
few school addresses that could not be found by the mapping software, we used print maps of 
Ontario streets that contain markers for existing and many previously existing schools.
48   
Across the 735 identified changes, we identified at least one school in 559 circles.  There 
are 58 public openings, 35 separate openings, 74 public closings, and 10 separate closures for 
which there were no existing schools within a reasonable distance.  We then eliminated circles 
that contained only rural schools that were affected by the change.  This leaves a total of 442 
changes that affected at least one non-rural school. Appendix Table 5 presents summary statistics 
on the refined circles we have selected by type of change.   
                                                 
47 For more recent years of the school enrollment data, we were able to obtain counts of students attending the 
school based on their postal codes.  This type of data is somewhat noisy as when compared with the location of the 
school there can be unrealistic distances between the students home postal code and the school.  Moreover, we have 
this information for only those schools that were operating in the latter years of the sample.  We, therefore, used this 
information to identify a baseline circle size of the catchment area of schools located in a given region. 
48 To define the circles, we used the latitude and longitude of the school based on its most recent street address. 
While information on latitude and longitude is publicly available from several sources, we found the most reliable 
source of this information from www.geocoder.ca.  The individuals that provide this service have taken publicly 
available data and corrected them.  Through our examination of printed maps and satellite images, we randomly 
confirmed that the information we received from Geocoder was better than the information from government 
sources.  45 
 
In Panel B of Appendix Table 5 we report statistics on the circles for which we identified 
at least one non-rural affected school.  The share of circles with existing public schools ranges 
from 86 to 100 percent.  The share of circles with existing separate schools ranges between 73 
and 95 percent.  For approximately 20-25 percent of the opening circles and 60-65 percent of the 
closing circles we excluded schools that were identified in the pre-defined circles.  For 
approximately 55-65 percent of the opening schools and 43-50 percent of the closing schools we 
added schools that are located outside of the pre-defined circle.  A small proportion of the 
openings and closings only use schools located outside of the pre-defined circle. 
Example of Circle Modification 
Elkhorn Public School opened in 1996 in North York, a community that is a part of the Toronto 
District School Board.
49   In 1996 it had a total enrollment of 297 students.  Students were 
enrolled in grades from kindergarten to grade 4.  In 1997, enrollment grew to 371 and the school 
had students enrolled from kindergarten to grade 5.  For the rest of the sample period, this school 
has had students enrolled in all of these grades.  Approximately 65 percent of the students have a 
primary language other than English.   
For this area, we estimated an average distance to school of 2.2 kilometers.  We identified 
and mapped all schools that were in operation at the time of the opening up to 3.2 kilometers.  
For these schools we mapped the location (based on their addresses) using a satellite image and 
using printed maps that contain the specific location of schools.  Below is a depiction of those 
schools that were within a radius of just less than 2.2 kilometers.  We do not depict the school 
that are beyond 2.2. kilometers from the school as the decision of whether to keep it was based 
on the decision regarding Lescon Public School (a school within the 2.2 kilometer radius). 
                                                 
49 On the location of this school, there was a public school that closed in 1985.  46 
 
Depicted are 10 schools, 7 are public and 3 are separate.  Among the public schools is 
Bayview Middle School.  Until 1995 it offered grades kindergarten to grade 8.  From 1996 
onwards, the school has only offered grades 6 to 8.  Thus, it appears that, in part, Elkhorn was 
established to take over the enrollment for Bayview.  Another public school in the area is 
Avondale Elementary Alternative School.  The school is alternative in that it allows for self-
directed learning.  It covers all elementary grades.  Since opening (in 1992), the enrollment has 
been just slightly under 100 students.  The remaining 5 public schools have average enrollments 
in grades 1 to 6 during the sample period that range between 126 and 281 students.  Of the three 
separate schools depicted, average enrollment in grades 1 to 6 ranged between 163 and 296 
students over the sample period.   
There are two issues that caused us to restrict the sample of schools treated as being 
within a close distance of the opened school.  First, there is a major freeway (Highway 401) that 
is located south of Elkhorn.  This resulted the in the exclusion of Dunlace and Harrison Public 
Schools.  Second, there is a ravine.  This excluded two of the three separate schools (Blessed 
Trinity and St. Mathias) and one of the public schools (Lescon).  The remaining schools are 
located within 2 kilometers of Elkhorn.  Given students could reside in areas between Elkhorn 
and these schools, it seems reasonable to include these schools as ones that are potentially 
affected by the opening.   
This leaves, however, only one potentially competing separate school.  Blessed Trinity is 
just beyond the ravine and is close to Finch Public School, a school that is treated as within the 
circle of the opening.  Figure 2 provides a more detailed image of the area around Blessed 
Trinity.  Figure 2 shows that Blessed Trinity and Finch schools are separated by two major roads.  
Moreover, there are few houses that lie in between these schools.  It appears that Blessed Trinity 47 
 
draws its students from the houses that are located north east of the school, an area that is farther 
away from Elkhorn.  Therefore, we decided that this school should not be treated as being 
potentially affected by the opening. 










 Appendix Table 1: Census-Based Characteristics of non-Rural FSA's w/ School Changes
                         Mean for FSA's with:                           
School School Openings
No Changes Openings Closings &Closings
1.  Number of FSA's 215 77 92 45
Basic FSA Characteristics:
2.  Total population 24,177 29,832 25,361 30,960
3.  Share of Houses Built Between 1991-2001 16.40% 32.59% 6.74% 14.13%
Presence of Children:
4.  Share of population age 5-9 6.4% 7.7% 5.8% 6.5%
5.  Share of population age 10-14 6.5% 7.7% 5.8% 6.6%
Family Characteristics:
7.  Share Single Parent Families 22.95% 17.65% 28.46% 24.59%
8.  Share with 1 Child 42.71% 36.88% 45.62% 42.12%
9.  Share with 2+ Children 39.48% 43.68% 37.77% 40.32%
Education (Adult Population):
10.  Share with University Degree 23.25% 24.32% 22.23% 19.79%
11.  Share without High School Diploma 27.33% 24.06% 30.63% 28.09%
Language, Nativity and Ethnicity:
12.  Share that Speak English at Home 90.40% 93.18% 88.16% 94.26%
13.  Share Immigrants 23.79% 32.93% 28.99% 21.23%
14.  Share Southwest Asian Ancestry 4.38% 8.63% 4.33% 2.69%
15.  Share East Asian Ancestry 5.70% 9.88% 8.09% 4.55%
16.  Share North European Ancestry 13.50% 10.14% 11.55% 14.35%
17.  Share  South European Ancestry 9.50% 15.26% 13.24% 9.57%
18.  Share East European Ancestry 10.93% 9.92% 11.11% 10.44%
Religious Affiliation:
19.  Share Catholic 35.27% 38.53% 40.21% 33.21%
20.  Share Protestant 40.96% 35.88% 33.60% 44.70%
21.  Share Other Religions 8.83% 12.16% 10.70% 6.70%
22.  Share No Religion 14.95% 13.42% 15.50% 15.39%
Note: based on FSA-tabulations of 1991-1996-2001-2006 Censuses. 
Religious measures, however, are available only for 1991 and 2001 Censuses
50Appendix Table 2: Distribution of Affected Schools by Numbers of
Opening and Closing Events that Affect the School










None 0 337 101 24
One Opening 272 48 12 9
Two Openings 90 7 1 0
Three Openings 34 0 0 0
Four-Six Openings 18 0 0 0
Note: sample of affected schools includes only non-rural schools.
51Appendix Table 3:  Coefficients on Closing Measures of Growth Models
   Percentage Change in Enrollment:
Grade 1 (t-1)  Grades 1-5 (t-1)
to Grade 1 (t) to Grades 2-6 (t)
         (1)           (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Effects of Nearby Closings (trend shift in following 3 years)
Own Effects:
1. Effect on Public School of Public Closing 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7
(1.5) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9)
2. Effect on Separate School of Separate Closing 7.7 6.1 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.0
(3.7) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2)
Cross Effects:
3. Effect on Separate School of Public Closing -0.6 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4
(1.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6)
4. Effect on Public School of Separate Closing 1.3 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
(1.6) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9)
School fixed effects and Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying school characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying local characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Base Opening Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Interaction Opening & Share New Housing No No Yes No No No No
Interaction Opening & Share Catholic No No No Yes Yes Yes No
Interaction Opening & Share Catholic*Share New Housing No No No No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 11,887 12,007 12,007 12,007 12,007 12,007 12,007
Number of Schools 939 945 945 945 945 945 945
Note: standard errors in parentheses.  School characteristics are a dummy for being paired with another school 
for administrative purposes.  Local characteristics are share of enrolled students in the FSA attending public 
French and private schools, total population in the FSA and shares of population ages 5-9 and 10-14,  fraction of 
FSA residents who are Catholic, fraction who are immigrants, fractions of FSA residents of East Asian, South 
Asian, and Northern, Southern, and Eastern European ancentry,  fraction of population with a university degree, 
fraction with no high school degree,  fraction of single-headed families, fraction of families with 2 or 3 kids,  and 
fraction of adults with home language other than English.  British or French ancentry treated as equivalent to 
"Canadian".  Eastern European ancentry groups includes countries formerly affiliated with the U.S.S.R.  
52Appendix Table 4: Summary Statistics for ALL EQAO Test Takers
              Public Schools             Separate Schools
Grade 3 Grade 6 Grade 3 Grade 6
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reading Tests
1.  Number of observations 293,146 327,443 154,565 167,482
2.  Average Score (1-4 Scale) 2.52 2.68 2.52 2.70
    (standard deviation) (0.76) (0.75) (0.75) (0.73)
3.  Share of Students with Missing Score 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.07
4.  Share of Missing Students Identified as Exceptional 0.23 0.12 0.26 0.14
5.  Share Included in Analysis Sample 0.73 0.70 0.96 0.91
Mathematics Tests
6.  Number of observations 314,614 330,125 160,318 168,228
7.  Average Score (1-4 Scale) 2.73 2.69 2.67 2.68
    (standard deviation) (0.75) (0.81) (0.73) (0.79)
8.  Share of Students with Missing Score 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06
9.  Share of Missing Students Identified as Exceptional 0.23 0.12 0.28 0.14
10.  Share Included in Analysis Sample 0.73 0.72 0.96 0.92
Writing Tests
11.  Number of observations 302,282 333,240 158,770 169,743
12.  Average Score (1-4 Scale) 2.66 2.67 2.68 2.71
      (standard deviation) (0.66) (0.71) (0.65) (0.75)
13.  Share of Students with Missing Score 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.06
14.  Share of Missing Students Identified as Exceptional 0.25 0.13 0.29 0.15
15.  Share Included in Analysis Sample 0.73 0.70 0.95 0.91
Notes: based on standardized tests administered in 1998-2005 to students in Grades 3 and 6.  







Number with at 
least one non-
rural school
1.  Public School Opening 252 58 159
2. Separate School Opening 169 34 107
3. Public School Closure 212 74 97
4. Separate School Closure 102 10 79
Panel B: Characteristics 










have at least 1 
school in intial 
circle dropped
Percent that 










1. Public School Opening 86.2% 92.5% 23.9% 54.7% 13.8%
2. Separate School Opening 87.9% 72.9% 20.6% 64.5% 16.8%
3. Public School Closure 96.9% 94.8% 64.9% 43.3% 5.2%
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55Table 1:  Summary Statistics on Opening and Closing Schools and Affected Schools
Panel A: Statistics on Schools that Open or Close











At Schools with 







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1.   Public Opening 252 0.599 0.631 303.9 282.8
2.  Separate Opening 169 0.604 0.633 315.5 285.8
3.  Public Closing 212 0.717 0.458 228.9 208.5
4.  Separate Closing 102 0.765 0.775 247.4 185.9
Panel B: Mean Distance to Non-Rural Affected  Schools (kilometers)










1.  Distance to Newly Opened Public School 1.12 1.21 1.02
    (number of schools) (473) (244) (229)
2.  Distance to Newly Opened Separate Schoo 1.21 1.13 1.06
    (number of schools) (261) (168) (93)
3.  Distance to Newly Closed Public School 1.07 1.12 0.98
    (number of schools) (414) (244) (170)
4.  Distance to Newly Closed Separate School 0.957 0.908 1.055
    (number of schools) (330) (220) (110)
Panel C: Distribution of Affected Schools by Numbers of Opening/Closing Events




Opening Public Close Separate Close
1.  Total Number of Schools 159 107 97 79
2.  Number of Non-rural Schools Affected:
       One School 24 24 6 4
      Two Schools 49 38 15 9
      Three Schools 31 25 27 22
      Four Schools 28 15 16 15
      Five Schools 21 4 3 11
      Six Schools 2 1 13 7
      Seven or More Schools 4 0 17 11
Note: Counts of opening/closing schools include only those with 1 or more nearby non-rural schools.
Note: see text for definitions.  Enrollment measure used in columns 4-5 is maximum combined enrollment in 
grades 1-6 observed at opened or closed school during sample period.
Note: mean distance calculated to schools within affected circle only.  Diameter of affected 
circle around opening or closing school based on local travel distances: see text. Schools 
affected by multiple openings/closings are included for each change. 
56Table 2: Summary Statistics on Enrollment Growth Measures
Public Schools Separate Schools
1.  Grade 1 Enrollment 50.4 44.3
    (Standard Deviation) (23.3) (21.0)
    Number of Observations 7,554 5,290
2.  Proportional Change in Grade 1 Enrollment from
     Previous Year to Current Year 1.87 2.38
     (Standard Deviation) (26.41) (30.54)
    Number of Observations 6,994 4,893
3.  Proportional Change in Enrollment from Grades
    1-5 Previous Year to Grades 2-6 Current Year 0.13 0.42
    (Standard Deviation) (17.35) (12.49)
    Number of Observations 7,067 4,940
Note: sample includes school-year observations for non-rural elementary schools affected by at 
least one opening or closing of nearby school over the sample period (1990-2004).
57Table 3:  Enrollment Growth Models
                                                            Enrollment Growth Measure
Change in 1st
Grade Enrollment      Change in Enrollment from Grades 1-5 in Year (t-1) to Grades 2-6 in Year (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Own-System Effects:
1.  Effect of Public Opening on Nearby Public School  -7.8 -6.3 -2.9 -6.3 -6.3 -2.9 -2.9
  (1.3) (0.7) (1.2) (0.7) (0.7) (1.2) (1.2)
2.     …Interacted with Share New Housing Stock in FSA −− -13.2 −− -12.8 -12.8
(4.1) (4.1) (4.1)
3.  Effect of Separate Opening on Nearby Separate School -9.7 -9.6 -9.0 -9.5 -9.5 -9.1 -9.1
(2.0) (1.3) (2.3) (1.3) (1.3) (2.3) (2.3)
4.     ...Interacted with Share New Housing Stock in FSA −− -1.4 −− -1.0 -1.1
(5.9) (5.9) (5.9)
Cross-System Effects:
5.  Effect of Public Opening on Nearby Separate School  -2.0 -1.1 1.1 0.1 −−−
(1.3) (0.6) (0.9) (2.2)
6.     ...Interacted with Share New Housing Stock in FSA −− -7.4 −− − −
(2.5)
7.     ...Interacted with Share of Catholics in FSA −− -3.2 -3.0 2.3 −
(5.9) (1.7) (2.5)
8.     ...Interacted with share of Catholics in FSA × − − −−− -15.6 -11.1
              Share New Housing Stock in FSA (6.8) (4.4)
9.  Effect of Separate Opening on Nearby Public School -3.3 -2.9 1.7 -3.0 −−−
(1.5) (0.9) (2.0) (4.2)
10.     ...Interacted with Share New Housing Stock in FSA −− -14.2 −− − −
(7.3)
11.     ...Interacted with Share of Catholics in FSA −− − 0.4 -7.7 7.5 −
(12.0) (2.5) (5.7)
12.    ...Interacted with share of Catholics in FSA × − − −−− -42.9 -27.4
              Share New Housing Stock in FSA (19.0) (9.2)
Own-system and cross-system closing effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects and Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying school characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying local characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 11,887 12,007 12,007 12,007 12,007 12,007 12,007
Number of schools 939 945 945 945 945 945 945
Note: standard errors in parentheses.  School characteristics are a dummy for being paired with another school for administrative purposes.  Local characteristics are share of enrolled students in 
the FSA attending public French and private schools, total population in the FSA and shares of population ages 5-9 and 10-14,  fraction of FSA residents who are Catholic, fraction who are 
immigrants, fractions of FSA residents of East Asian, South Asian, and Northern, Southern, and Eastern European ancentry,  fraction of population with a university degree, fraction with no high 
school degree,  fraction of single-headed families, fraction of families with 2 or 3 kids,  and fraction of adults with home language other than English.  British or French ancentry treated as 
equivalent to "Canadian".  Eastern European ancentry groups includes countries formerly affiliated with the U.S.S.R.  
58Table 4: Summary Statistics for EQAO Test Takers
           Public Schools             Separate Schools
Grade 3 Grade 6 Grade 3 Grade 6
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Test-Taker Characteristics for Students with At Least One Test Score:
1.  Number of observations 323,508 340,259 164,502 172,409
2.  Share Female 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
3.  Share missing Gender 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.005
4.  Share ESL Students 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.02
5.  Share Exceptional Students 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
6.  Share Attended Kindergarden 0.86 0.73 0.89 0.75
7.  Share Missing Kindergarden Information 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.23
8.  Share French Immersion Students 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.04
9.  Share Gifted Students 0.01 0.02 0.001 0.01
10.  Share with Scores for All Three Tests  0.64 0.65 0.87 0.86
Reading Tests
11.   Number of observations 212,761 229,650 147,721 152,638
12.  Average Score (1-4 Scale) 2.52 2.68 2.52 2.70
       (standard deviation) (0.76) (0.74) (0.75) (0.73)
13.   Share of Students with Missing Score 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.07
14.   Share of Missing Students Identified as Exceptional 0.23 0.12 0.26 0.14
Mathematics Tests
15.   Number of observations 230,562 238,153 153,117 154,042
16.   Average Score (1-4 Scale) 2.73 2.71 2.68 2.68
        (standard deviation) (0.75) (0.80) (0.73) (0.79)
17.   Share of Students with Missing Score 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06
18.   Share of Missing Students Identified as Exceptional 0.23 0.12 0.28 0.14
Writing Tests
19.   Number of observations 219,835 233,759 151,622 154,773
20.   Average Score (1-4 Scale) 2.66 2.67 2.69 2.71
       (standard deviation) (0.66) (0.71) (0.65) (0.69)
21.   Share of Students with Missing Score 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.06
22.   Share of Missing Students Identified as Exceptional 0.25 0.14 0.29 0.15
Notes: based on standardized tests administered in 1998-2005 to students in Grades 3 and 6.  Student observations are 
included for school-cohorts that have at least 10 test takers in grade 3 and 3 years later in grade 6, with the ratio of the number 
of test takers in grade 6 to the number in grade 3 between 0.71 and 1.40.  
59Table 5:  Relationship Between Religion and Education/Earnings Among Ontario Parents
    Dependent Variable = Years Education   Dependent Variable = Log Weekly Wages
          Mothers          Fathers         Mothers          Fathers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1. Catholic 0.13 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.00
(0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2. Other Religion (not Catholic − -0.20 − 0.08 − -0.07 − -0.08
   or Protestant) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
3. No Religion − -0.44 − -0.32 − -0.04 − -0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
4. Dummies for Country of Origin? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5. Dummies for Metro Area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
    (CMA)?
6. Mean of Dependent Variable 14.16 14.16 14.20 14.20 6.21 6.21 6.75 6.75
   [standard deviation] [2.78] [2.78] [2.94] [2.94] [0.83] [0.83] [0.74] [0.74]
7. Number of Observations 31,744 31,744 27,988 27,988 22,652 22,652 23,467 23,467
Notes: Sample includes household heads and spouses age 24-64 in households with at least one child age 15 or less living in the 
province of Ontario in 2001 Canadian Census.  Dependent variable in columns 1-4 is estimated years of completed education.  
Dependent variable in columns 5-8 is log average weekly wage last year.  For specifications in odd-numbered columns omitted 
religious group is all non-Catholics (including those with no religion).   For specifications in even-numbered columns omitted 
religious group is Protestants.  Models are fit by unweighted OLS.   Standard errors in parentheses.
60Table 6:  Models for 8th Grade Test Scores and Test Score Gains from 8th to 10th Grade, Students in NELS-88
     8th Grade Tests     Test Gain: 10th-8th      8th Grade Tests     Test Gain: 10th-8th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1.  Catholic 120.5 33.9 37.4 17.0 102.0 14.4 35.9 14.7
(18.5) (20.9) (10.5) (11.8) (21.9) (24.2) (12.3) (13.7)
2.  Other Religion (Not Protestant − -39.0 − -25.3 − -22.3 − -26.4
      or Catholic) (22.4) (12.7) (24.2) (13.6)
3.  No Religion − -57.2 − -41.3 − -41.4 − -40.8
(29.3) (16.6) (30.7) (17.3)
4.  Religion Not Reported − -365.7 − -68.9 − -389.0 − -66.5
(23.8) (16.3) (25.2) (17.1)
5. Controls for Gender, Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
6. Controls for Urban Location and  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
   Division 
7. Controls for Parents' Education, Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
   Living with Mother/Father at
   8th Grade, and SES Quartile
8. Mean of Dependent Variable 5081.1 5081.1 -33.3 -33.3 4973.6 4973.6 -38.1 -33.3
   [standard deviation] [988.5] [988.5] [472.4] [472.4] [979.4] [979.4] [470.1] [472.4]
9. Number of Observations 13,315 13,315 12,037 12,037 11,078 11,078 9,970 9,970
                              All Students   Students in Public Schools in 8th Grade
Notes:  Dependent variable in columns 1-2 and 5-6 is composite test score (math and reading) in 8th grade.  Dependent variable in columns 3-
4 and 7-8 is change in composite test score from 8th to 10th grade.  Models are fit by unweighted OLS and do not account for NELS sample 
design.  For specifications in odd-numbered columns, omitted religious group is all other religions (including none and not reported).  For 
specification in even-numbered columns, omitted religious group is Protestants (i.e., Baptists, Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, 
Episcopalians, Pentacostals, and Other Protestants).  Missing data for mother's or father's education are allocated and models include 
dummies for missing data. Standard errors in parentheses.
61Table 7:  Test Score Growth Models
                Reading                      Mathematics              Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Local Competition Measures:
1.  Share of Catholics × Grade 6 0.14 0.10 −− 0.31 0.25 −− 0.13 0.10 −−
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05)
2. Share of Catholics × Share New Housing Stock  − 0.28 0.39 0.35 0.40 0.71 0.50 0.24 0.35 0.26
       × Grade 6 (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.23) (0.20) (0.21) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Other Controls:
3. Share with No Religion × Grade 6 −− − -0.15 −− −-0.65 −− −-0.26
(0.11) (0.16) (0.09)
4. Share with Other Religions × Grade 6 −− − 0.07 −− −0.17 −− − 0.06
(0.07) (0.10) (0.05)
5. Dummy = 1 if Test Taker in Grade 6 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.10 -0.27 -0.25 -0.14 -0.04 -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
6. Separate School × Grade 6 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
7. Share of New Housing Stock × Grade 6  -0.01 -0.11 -0.15 -0.15 0.06 -0.09 -0.21 -0.16 0.02 -0.07 -0.12 -0.10
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Student, Peer Group, and Neighborhood Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School-Cohort Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-Square 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Number of Observations
Notes: standard errors (clustered by school) are reported in parentheses.  Dependent variable is student level test score in reading (columns 1-4) mathematics (columns 5-8) or writing 
(columns 9-12) in grade 3 or grade 6.  All models include individual-level controls, controls for the average characteristics of the students in each school-cohort, and FSA-level controls.  
See text for description of additional controls.
Dependent Variable: Individual Test Score  (4-point 
scale from 1 to 4, standard deviation≈0.75)
742,770 775,874 759,989
62